This article will aim to explore what a Crimean operation may look like. Or, at least, what kinds of objectives and factors may weigh into the local commander’s tactical thinking. We don’t know the details of Russian force dispositions in defense of Crimea, nor how the Russians would respond to a given operation.
There are a lot of unknowable things like what kind of shape is the Russian force in after losing the Battle of Tokmak/Melitopol. Are they demoralized? How did Russian trench defenses hold up against Ukrainian Combined Arms? How did the Ukrainian drone army perform? And much, much more.
This hypothetical is not meant as a “prediction” of how the campaign will play out, but an exploration of what the expected strengths and weakness of a Russian position will be given the logistical limitations imposed by a hypothetical Ukrainian interdiction campaign.
Additionally, what are Ukrainian capabilities and limitations?
We looked at a variety of logistical weaknesses of the Russian Army occupying Crimea. In Part I, we discussed how the Kerch Bridge is vulnerable to air attack. In Part II, we explored the weaknesses of the Crimean rail system. And Part III explored the vulnerability of Crimean ports to interdiction.
These logistical weaknesses will likely play a role in shaping how a land campaign in Crimea plays out.
To liberate Crimea, the Armed Forces of Ukraine will need to figure out a way to get onto the peninsula. They have 4 options.
- The Isthmus of Perekop
- The Chonhar Peninsula
- Arabat Spit
- Amphibious/Helicopter Assault
Of these 4 options, it appears there is only 1 realistic option: forcing the Isthmus of Perekop. I’ll explain in turn why the other options are unattractive.
First, it’s useful to understand that most of what separates Northern Crimea from the mainland is not the sea, in a conventional sense. It is a swampy lagoon called the Syvash.
The Syvash is extremely shallow, being between 1m (3ft) to 3m (9ft) in depth in most parts, with much of the lagoon being between 1-1.5m in depth. Water levels vary as much as 1-2ft by season, with the levels being highest with the snowmelts of spring to early summer and lowest around mid-November.
The bottom of the Syvash is a thick sticky silt.
The Syvash is separated from the Sea of Azov to the east by a narrow strip of land called the Arabat Spit. The Sea of Azov is also very shallow, with many parts no deeper than 2-9m near the shores, making it too shallow to navigate for most ocean-going vessels.
Chonhar
The Chonhar Peninsula is not physically connected to the Crimean Peninsula but is separated from Crimea by the Strait of Chonhar and the Western Syvash. It is option two listed on the bigger map of Northern Crimea above.
The road bridge below crosses the Strait of Chonhar, which separates the Eastern and Western Syvash.
The Strait of Chonhar is about 80m wide at the narrowest point, making it too wide for even the longest mobile bridges. To bridge the gap, a temporary bridge would need to be constructed over several hours, or a pontoon bridge established.
There is also a rail crossing to the southeast, south of the town of Syvash. There is a very short bridge connected to an artificial land bridge that spans most of the Syvash. I could not find information on the length of this bridge, but on Google Earth, it displays as approximately the same length as the road bridge spanning the Chonhar Strait, so my best guess is around 80m. The land bridge portion is much longer, spanning around 2km (1.3 miles).
Depending on when the operation takes place, the Syvash may be crossable either on foot or by fording by tanks or armored vehicles with good seals. For example, the M2 Bradley is listed as capable of fording a water depth of 1.1m (about 4 feet).
Indeed, during the 1944 Soviet offensive to recapture Crimea, Soviet forces crossed the Syvash from Chonhar on foot to launch surprise attacks on German positions in an attempt to support a push through the Isthmus of Perekop to the west.
However, the Chonhar is simply very ill-suited to serve as the site of the main Ukrainian push.
The Russians know their history and have prepared trenches, dragons teeth, and other defensive structures at the two crossing sites from Chonhar.
Fording the Syvash is a struggle on foot, it would be brutal bringing 30-70 ton tracked vehicles across. Then bringing supplies across such extremely narrow stretches would be difficult in the face of Russian artillery.
Although Ukrainian tanks and armored vehicles might ford the Syvash, Ukrainian supply trucks certainly cannot.
And once you finish the crossing, you still face the main Russian defensive line by Dzhankoi. It would not outflank the Russians.
There seem to be few benefits and many drawbacks.
Arabat Spit
Trying to push down the 120km long Arabat Spit is a far more quixotic endeavor with no historical precedent—with good reason. The route would have the benefit of bypassing almost all Russian defenses to arrive at the neck of the Kerch Peninsula, potentially cutting the Russian position in two.
Unfortunately, it’s entirely impractical as a route of advance.
The Arabat Spit is almost entirely unpaved. It is less than 300m wide (about 3 football field lengths) at many points, and is about 3km (2 mi) wide at most portions.
Flat and without much by way of vegetation or hills, the entire route is only about 2000~3000m from the Crimean mainland’s eastern coast, leaving it well within not only artillery range but also mortars, ATGM (antitank guided missiles), MLRS (Rocket artillery), many tank guns, basically anything longer ranged than small arms.
The idea of running supplies down this narrow unpaved road without first securing the Eastern coast of Crimea is wholly unrealistic.
Amphibious/Helicopter Assault
it is certainly conceivable that Ukraine could pair an amphibious operation or a helicopter assault as part of its operation to liberate Crimea. What won’t happen is a Normandy Beach Landings style army-sized amphibious landing operation. Ukraine simply doesn’t have the equipment to make that happen.
Ukraine’s only operational amphibious operations vessel is the 53-year-old Yuri Olefirenko, an 1192-ton Polnocny-class ship.
It can carry 200-300 dismounted infantry, or up to a single tank platoon (four tanks). it can launch three landing ships that can take this equipment to shore and back.
This can certainly be supplemented by motorboats, transport helicopters, and possibly even parachute airborne troops (some Ukrainian Air Assault units are trained as parachute airborne infantry). M777 howitzers can be air transported by helicopter, as can the FMTV 5-ton truck that tows it.
Even then, it seems very difficult to imagine how Ukraine could land more than 1000-2000 infantry, supported by at most a platoon of tanks and a smattering of supporting artillery.
Beyond that, the problem is logistical—even if the units could be landed, supporting the troops becomes a major challenge very quickly.
US amphibious operations are supported by Amphibious Assault ships, like the massive USS Iwo Jima, a 40,000t+ vessel that can operate dozens of support and attack helicopters, 26 F35s, and dozens of landing ships.
It is hard to see how Ukraine could even logistically support a regiment-sized unit by amphibious forces, let alone a major force capable of capturing a port that could serve as a base of supplies.
This is before even getting into the vulnerabilities of helicopters to MANPADS (infantry-carried anti-aircraft missiles) and landing ships to even the most basic anti-ship missiles.
Any amphibious or airborne attack could only support, not replace a main assault by land.
Isthmus of Perekop
That leaves just one route as the only practical entry point to Crimea: the Isthmus of Perekop.
There is a very old history of strategic importance for the famed Isthmus. The ancient Greeks built the first fortifications in this area, as did the Tatars. It was a site of key battles in 1920 during the Russian Civil War, as well as during the German offensive in 1941 and the Soviet counteroffensive in 1944 during World War Two.
Crimea’s reputation as a formidable defensive position is partly based on the way attackers are funneled through this narrow 5km wide strip of land.
The Russian Army clearly anticipates an offensive through this sector, preparing 5 lines of defenses, 15-20km apart.
The famous Perekop Wall has been incorporated into the 2nd Russian line of defense above. A 10km long defensive position that crosses the Isthmus in its entirety, a long defensive ditch was first built by the Tartars in the late middle ages. This was then further strengthened by the Ottomans to incorporate a large 25~30 foot high earthen wall.
The Soviets attempted to use this position to their advantage in 1941, as did the Germans in 1944, so it has a significant modern history of practical military usage.
It is traversable by tracked vehicles, as the Germans did in 1941, but unless the opposite side is cleared, it can expose the weak top armor of tanks and armored vehicles to an enemy on the other side.
The sheer narrowness of the position (about 10-15km) permits the enemy to concentrate large quantities of artillery on the position, while the terrain precludes any possibility of flanking the enemy position. The terrain is flat, featureless with no forests or hills giving wide visibility for long distances.
Then, the 4th and arguably most formidable defensive position is around Krasnoperekopsk. From the west, the Stare Lake, Krasne Lake, and Kylatske Lake serve to break up the avenues of advance into narrow 1km~3km side corridors.
The Russians appear to have prepared some defensive trenchworks, particularly at the narrow positions in this area.
Krasnoperekopsk is a small town of 26,000 residents, and the town is composed mostly of single-story stores, offices, and single-family homes. It has a few larger apartments, but no major buildings.
A Google Earth view of the terrain shows the flat featureless farmland that surrounds this area, providing broad visibility. As an aside, Stare Lake is that strange color due to microscopic algae that turns the waters brown or even a bright pink during different times of the year.
While this type of terrain was well suited for defensive operations in 1941, it is not nearly as advantageous for a defender in 2023.
Attacking Perekop
The 1941 Battle of Perekop might be instructive. The German forces under von Manstein advanced on the Isthmus of Perekop on Sept. 25, 1941. Manstein lacked much heavy armor to make the assault but was able to procure some assault guns that would prove critical for his assault.
The predominantly infantry-based Soviet army deployed in a series of 4 trench lines supported by artillery that Manstein had to attack frontally.
Utilizing predominantly WW1-era tactics owing to insufficient armor, the German Army systematically isolated each line of defense through bombardment of rearward areas with artillery and air strikes, while launching stormtrooper assault teams in breach attacks at points in the Soviet line.
Although the Germans suffered over a thousand casualties and suffered some brutal failed assaults, the German Army overran the Soviet final defensive line at the Isthmus in just 5 days.
Germany’s 1941 Crimean Campaign is remembered as a long and brutal eight-month slog, but the lion’s share of the fighting occurred during the German Army’s Siege of Sevastopol. The attack through Perekop is barely a footnote to the overall campaign.
So right off the bat, the idea that the Perekop position is some kind of impenetrable fortress should be dispensed with.
The key in 2023 will be much the same as in 1941. Isolating each defensive line with artillery and air strikes, before breaching the defensive line with armored vehicles.
This task, in many ways, is far easier today than in 1941, since the assault infantry will be taken into battle on armored vehicles, not charging at enemy trench positions on foot. Some people point out the vulnerability of APCs to ATGMs (Antitank Guided Missiles) but they are immeasurably better protected than charging dismounted infantry.
The fact that the assault force will almost certainly be fully mounted and armored makes the Russian artillery focused on the battle far less effective.
The Ukrainians have weapons like the BONUS or SMArt artillery rounds, which are guided antitank munitions that can be fired by howitzers from 20~30km away. But the best artillery munitions that the Russians can use are laser-guided munitions that they have in highly limited quantities.
The Russians can fire huge quantities of 152mm unguided shells at the Ukrainian advance, but infantry protected in APCs (Armored personnel carriers) and IFVs (Infantry Fighting Vehicles) will be shielded from anything short of a direct hit, making them far more resilient against Russian artillery fire.
An assault will rely first on softening the target with massed artillery bombardments, with precision munitions (HIMARS, Excalibur GPS artillery, JDAM bombs) targeting key enemy logistics and command and control positions.
Ukrainian tank companies will advance, and Western tanks will use their superior armor and targeting abilities to rapidly clear the defensive enemy of any armored vehicles. With the lack of trees, cover, or terrain features to create blindspots, there will be nowhere for Russian AFVs (armored fighting vehicles) to hide.
Any units in hard-to-reach areas can be eliminated with BONUS artillery rounds or JDAM air strikes.
Russian machine gun positions will be powerless to stop an armored advance by mounted mechanized infantry. The same open terrain that was so daunting to German assault infantry in 1941 instead works to a technologically advanced attacker’s advantage, as Ukraine’s Western Tanks can maximize their range advantages over their Russian counterparts.
Once the enemy trench line is isolated and left unsupported by armor, the Ukrainian Sapper units (combat engineers) can move forwards and begin clearing mines and obstacles.
Then, the Ukrainian armored units and mechanized units will surge forwards and breach the enemy line of defense—once the position is overrun, onto the next line of defense.
The Germans took numerous casualties pressing forwards through the Isthmus because Russian artillery concentrated on the narrow portion of the battlefield was deadly to dense groups of infantry necessary to assault entrenched positions.
Today, with mechanized infantry in armored vehicles, particularly against an enemy like the Russians who have very limited quantities of guided munitions, the Russian artillery poses less of a threat than might be supposed.
This is not to mention, the Western artillery outclasses Russian artillery in accuracy and range. 155mm tube artillery firing RAP (Rocket Assisted Projectiles) can hit ranges of 30-40km, well beyond Russian 152mm artillery firing around 22-24km. Excalibur GPS rounds and HIMARS rockets give Ukrainian artillery precision strike capabilities in quantities that Russian artillery can only dream about.
Ukrainian counterbattery fire should be capable of pushing Russian artillery into having lower concentrations and force frequent moving to reduce their volume of fire.
It is difficult to see how Ukraine would have a more difficult time forcing the Isthmus.
Into Crimea
If Ukraine can punch through the Isthmus and advance to Vorontsivka, it’s difficult to see how a Russian defense of Crimea would possibly work.
It would be difficult to push due east to Dzhankoi, but the flat northern plains of Crimea are excellent tank country, and Ukraine can simply push south along the H05 Highway before turning left along any number of roads and cutting behind Dzhankoi.
Ukraine could send a small force westward to the Takhankut Peninsula, where establishing some Harpoon Anti-ship Missile Batteries would effectively block the port of Sevastopol from all shipping.
Russia, lacking long-range precision weapons like the HIMARS or Excalibur Shells, would struggle in turn to interdict the flow of Ukrainian supplies. There are no bridges to blow on the route through the Isthmus of Perekop, so once Russian troops are pushed sufficiently backward from the main road, Ukraine could simply guard against air attacks with a Patriot battery and/or modern Western air defense systems like IRIS-T to secure its line of logistics.
Given the interdiction campaign described in Parts I-III, Russia should be in a place that makes it difficult to supply reinforcements and ammunition to the western half of Crimea.
So Ukraine could make its main axis of advance initially along the West.
In such an advance, Russia will be forced to fight a defensive battle where its supplies have to somehow find their way through the rail junction at Dzhankoi that will come under constant attack, or will have to bring supplies 100km from the nearest railhead by truck. The logistical stresses on the Russian army defending Western Crimea will be significant.
If Ukraine controls the Tarkhankut Peninsula, it can cut off the naval supply of Sevastopol with Harpoon Antiship MIssile Batteries. Then it will be difficult to see how a Russian army can hold out in a siege of the city. Once Sevastopol falls, Ukraine can turn its attention to advancing on Kerch with its western flank secure.
Alternatively, if there is an opportunity to do so, Ukraine could turn eastward early, and attempt to encircle and/or cut off the Russian forces around the fortifications of Dzhankoi.
The flat plains of Northern and Central Crimea provide plenty of opportunities for fast maneuvers and exploitation of breakthroughs.
Russia might make a final stand in the Kerch Peninsula. Indeed, Russian fortifications are already under construction there, indicating how Russia believes the next several months may play out.
It is difficult to see how such a defense could be successful, as Ukraine will be able to pound the Kerch area with GLSDBs, Storm Shadow cruise missiles, until its main force can advance just 15-20kms into the peninsula when Kerch will come into HIMARS GMLRS rocket range. With the additional rocket supply pounding port and rail facilities in Kerch, the Russian supply situation should rapidly become untenable.
Any Crimean Campaign is likely to be hard fought. It will likely cost Ukraine several thousand casualties, if not more.
But given the long-range weapons capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the advantage in armor quality (and possibly quantity by this campaign) it holds, combined with the flat tank-friendly terrain throughout much of the key defensive locales of the Crimean Peninsula, it is very difficult to see how Russia could possibly defend a strong Ukrainian attack.
If Ukraine can break through Russian defenses and advance to the neck of Crimea by the end of Summer (a big IF), I would be surprised if Crimea is not liberated during Winter 2023~24.
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Previous Articles in Series:
Quick Explainer: Hypothetical Crimean Campaign Part I--Taking Down the Kerch Bridge
Quick Explainer: Hypothetical Crimean Campaign Part II--Wrecking the Crimean Rail System
Quick Explainer: Hypothetical Crimean Campaign Part III-- Blockading the Ports